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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ashli Marie Easterday appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to
suppress evidence found in a search of her purse. Below, she asserted that, following a
traffic stop and a canine alert on her vehicle, the officer illegally searched her purse. The
district court denied the motion, and Ms. Easterday entered a conditional plea of guilty,
preserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the afternoon of July

2013, Deputy Stacy Gorrell,

the Twin Falls Sherriff's

Office, pulled over a vehicle driven by Ms. Ashli Easterday. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.11, L.8

p.13,

L.18.) Deputy Gorrell had earlier received a call from a man saying that he had loaned
his car to his ex-girlfriend, but she had not returned it to him. 1 (Tr. 8/2/13, p.12, Ls.6-15.)
The owner gave Deputy Gorrell a description of the car and the license plate number,
and, shortly thereafter, Deputy Gorrell saw the car at a stoplight and stopped it.
(Tr. 8/2/13, p.12, L.16 - p.13, L.3.) When he made contact with Ms. Easterday, he told
her that she did not have permission to be driving the vehicle, and she could call
someone to come and pick her up. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.18, Ls.7-16.)
Apparently because Deputy Gorrell thought Ms. Easterday was nervous when he
was talking with her, he called in Buhl Police Canine Officer Engbaum. (R., pp.9-10.)
When Officer Engbaum arrived, his dog performed a "free-air sniff" around the car.
(Tr. 8/2/13, p.7, Ls.3-15.) And, according to Officer Engbaum, his dog alerted on the

1

Deputy Gorrell was told by his dispatch to call the owner regarding the complaint, and
apparently, the owner was returning his call. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.17, Ls.9-16.)

1

driver's side and passenger's side doors, so he reported this to Deputy Gorrell.
(Tr. 8/2/13, p. 7, Ls.16-22.) Deputy Gorrell explained that he then went back to the car,
told Ms. Easterday about the aleti, and asked her to step out. (R., p.1 O; Tr. 8/2/13, p.15,
Ls.1-3.)

He said that when she complied, she "grabbed her purse," which had been

sitting "right beside her" on the front bench seat. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, Ls.4-19, p.18, L.20p.19, L.1.)
Ms. Easterday then walked back to the patrol car with Deputy Gorrell, and he told
her that he was going to search her purse because it was sitting on the seat when the
dog indicated on the car. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, Ls.21-25; R., p10.) Ms. Easterday did not
consent to the search and became "really agitated" and "asked why her purse had
anything to do with the stop." (Tr. 8/2/13, p.20, Ls.1-6; R., p.10.) Deputy Gorrell said he
told her that when the dog indicated on the vehicle, that gave him probable cause to
search the car and the bags in the car, and she had to let him search it, so she finally
gave him her purse. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.20, Ls.1-6; R., p.10.) When he searched the purse,
Deputy Gorrell found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.

(Tr., 8/2/13, p.16,

Ls.1-8.)
As a result, Deputy Gorrell arrested Ms. Easterday, and she was subsequently
charged with possession of a controlled substance.

(R., pp.10, 63-65.)

She filed a

motion to suppress the evidence, and a memorandum in support of the motion, arguing
that the search of her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. (R., pp.82-90.) After
a hearing, the district court denied the motion because it found that, despite the fact that
Ms. Easterday exited the car with her purse, she did not attempt "to make the purse part
of her person prior to the time that probable cause to search was established."

2

(R., pp.104-05.)

Ms. Easterday then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of

possession of a controlled substance; that plea preserved her ability to challenge the

district court's order denying her motion to suppress. (R., pp.108-117.) Later, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, but suspended the
sentence and placed Ms. Easterday on probation for three years.

(R., pp.140-151.)

Ms. Easterday then filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the judgment of
conviction and the order placing her on probation. (R., pp.164-167.)

3

ISSUE

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Easterday's motion to suppress because
Deputy Gorrell impermissibly expanded the search of the car to a search of
Ms. Easterday's person?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Easterday's Motion To Suppress Because
Deputy Gorrell lmpermissibly Expanded The Search Of The Car To A Search Of
Ms. Easterday's Person

A.

Introduction
The district court should have granted Ms. Easterday's motion to suppress

because Officer Gorrell illegally searched her purse, which should have

considered

part of her person when she exited the car with it. Therefore, the purse was not subject
to search under the automobile exception absent some further justification beyond the
canine alert on

B.

car.

Standard of Review
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated

standard. State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998). The Court accepts the
trial court's determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews
"the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."

Id.

Neither party

disputes the facts in this case. Thus the Court has free review as to whether the police
officer's actions were permitted under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. State v. Pick, 124 Idaho
601, 604 (Ct. App. 1993).
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Easterday's Motion To Suppress
Because It Interpreted The Precedent On This Issue In A Way That Could I ead
To An Unworkable Rule

1.

Ms. Easterday Took Her Purse With Her When She Exited The Car, So It
Should Have Been Considered Part Of Her Person And Not Subject To
Search

When Ms. Easterday stepped out of her car, she took her purse, which had been
sitting right next to her on the seat of the car where women ordinarily place a purse while
driving and while getting items such as a driver's license out of the purse. (Tr. 8/2/13,
p.15, Ls.4-19.) Therefore, it was part of her person and not subject to search under
these circumstances.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 Section 17
of the Idaho Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17.

The purpose of this constitutional right is to

"impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental
agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary
invasions."

State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002).

detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.

Searches or

Coolidge v.

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129
(Ct. App. 2002).
A traffic stop is a seizure of the driver in a vehicle and "is therefore subject to
Fourth Amendment strictures, but because it is limited in scope and duration, it is
analogous to an investigative detention." State v. Stewarl, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App.
2008). Once an officer has stopped a vehicle, a subsequent investigation "can ripen into
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probable cause as soon as a drug detection dog alerts on the exterior of the vehicle,
justifying a search of the vehicle without the necessity of a warrant" based on the
automobile exception.

State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843 (1999) (citing State v.

Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1992)). VVhile that exception exists, it has a limited scope

because the "occupants of a car continue to have a heightened expectation of privacy,
which protects against personal searches without a warrant." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho
277, 282 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999)). Thus
the automobile exception allows searches of containers that may hold contraband but
does not automatically allow searches of drivers and passengers.
Purses, when in normal use, enjoy heightened protection from searches because
they are considered part of the person. In Idaho, when a driver or passenger attempts to
take her purse with her when exiting the vehicle, the purse is part of her person and not
subject to search under the automobile exception.

See State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho

698, 700 (1998); State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162-63 (2000). When purses are not
left in the vehicle voluntarily, they are not subject to search. Newsom, 132 Idaho at 700.
In Newsom, Boise police officers stopped a car after learning that the registered owner
had felony arrest warrants, and they asked the passenger (Ms. Newsom) to get out. Id.
at 699. When she did, she attempted to bring her purse with her. However, one of the
officers told her to leave it in the car.

Upon a subsequent search of the vehicle

Id.

incident to the driver's arrest, the other officer on scene searched Ms. Newsom's purse
and found methamphetamine. Id. The district court denied her motion to suppress, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. However, the Idaho Supreme Court held that when
the defendant attempted to bring her purse, which had been sitting in her lap, with her
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and did not "leave the purse in the vehicle voluntarily," the search of her purse was
unlawful because "the purse was entitled to as much privacy and freedom from search
and seizure as the passenger herself." Id. at 700.
Two years later, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the holding in Newsom and
illustrated the crucial issue in these cases-whether the owner of the purse attempts to
take the purse out of the car when asked to exit. Holland, 135 Idaho at 163. In Holland,
the defendant was once again a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police. Id.
at 160. After pulling the vehicle over, the deputy discovered that there was a warrant for
the driver's arrest and promptly arrested him. Id. The deputy then asked the passenger
(Ms. Holland) to step out of the vehicle because it had to be impounded. Id. The Court

stated that "[e]ither while she was exiting the car, or shortly thereafter," she asked to take
a jacket and purse with her that were still in the car. Id. The officer agreed but said he
would

have to search the purse for weapons first; when he did,

he found

methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Id.
In support of her motion to suppress, Ms. Holland argued that, based on Newsom,
the search of her purse exceeded the scope of a search incident to arrest of the driver.
Id. at 162. The Court explained that the only reason the purse in Newsom "became a

container inside the passenger compartment and subject to the search incident to the
arrest of the driver was because the police ordered Newsom to place her purse back
inside the vehicle." Id. The Court also said that "[t]he holding in Newsom does not stand
for the proposition that a passenger's belongings may never be searched.

Instead,

Newsom stands for the proposition that the police cannot create a right to search a
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container by placing it within the passenger compartment of a car or by ordering
someone else to place it there for them." Id. at 163.
The Court then pointed out that Ms. Holland did not take her purse with her, and
the police did not put her purse back in the car or "order her to place it there. Instead, as
Holland exited the vehicle she voluntarily left her purse behind.

The purse was,

therefore, a container within the passenger compartment of the vehicle and subject to a
search incident to the arrest of the driver." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court made
it clear that the meaningful distinction between the two cases was whether the owner of

the purse took it with her or left it behind when exiting the car.
In a subsequent case, after stopping a car for a seat belt infraction, police
discovered there was an arrest warrant for one of the passengers. State v. Roe, 140
Idaho 176, 179 (Ct. App. 2004).

After arresting him, the officers asked the other

passengers to step out of the car so they could search the back seat compartment. Id.
As one of them (Mr. Roe) was exiting, he tried to bring a pair of shorts with him. Id. The
officer told Mr. Roe to leave them in the vehicle and subsequently found marijuana in the
pocket of the shorts. Id. Later, Mr. Roe filed a motion to suppress arguing, inter alia,
that, based on the holding in Newsom, the police had no grounds to tell him to leave his
shorts in the car. Id. The district court granted the motion, and the State appealed. Id.
The Court of Appeals stated "We agree that a purse and perhaps a billfold are
items that can be considered part of the person, much like the clothing a person is
wearing." Id. at 183.

The Court eventually held that "a pair of shorts not being worn at

the time and which are not ordinarily carried with a person is more akin to a container
found inside a vehicle. We conclude that a passenger cannot, upon being asked to exit a
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vehicle, extract various containers from the vehicle to avoid search of the containers."
Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court of Appeals made it clear once again
that what matters is whether the purse is taken with its owner.

And, unlike a pair of

shorts which are not ordinarily carried with a person when leaving a car, a purse is
ordinarily carried with a person, but not until that person exits the car, especially if the
owner of the purse is the driver, as was the case here.
Less than a year later, in a case with very similar facts to this case, the Court of
Appeals held that a man's wallet, found in his jacket after a drug dog alerted on his car,
could not be searched under the automobile exception. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,
282 (Ct. App. 2005).

There, as here, after one officer pulled the car over, a second

officer arrived with a drug detection canine. Id. at 280. While the occupants were still in
the vehicle, the canine alerted on the passenger door. Id. As a result, the officers asked
Mr. Gibson to step out of the car, searched the car, then patted him down, and removed
his wallet from his jacket.

Id.

They subsequently searched the wallet and found

methamphetamine. Id.
The district court denied Mr. Gibson's motion to suppress "finding that the dog's
alert gave the officers probable cause to suspect that there were drugs either in the
vehicle or on its occupants." Id. However, in discussing the search of Mr. Gibson, the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed that "personal searches of vehicle occupants are not
authorized under the automobile exception as a result of the occupant's mere presence
within a vehicle" when probable cause is established. Id. at 282. As a result, it held that
the district court erred when it found that the officers could search Mr. Gibson's person,
which included his wallet, when they did not find any contraband in his car. Id.
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There is no meaningful difference between the facts in Gibson and the facts in this
case other than the fact that Ms. Easterday exited her car with a purse instead of a
wallet, and Idaho precedent clearly demonstrates that purses enjoy the same protection
as wallets.

And, notably, there was absolutely no discussion in Gibson of where

Mr. Gibson's wallet was located prior to him exiting the car. Indeed, after he was pulled
over, he likely had to take his wallet out of his jacket to show his driver's license to the
officers. When he did, he may well have set his wallet down on the console next to him.
The reason there was no discussion of where the wallet was prior to his exiting the
vehicle, and no conjecture along these lines, is because the location of the purse or
wallet within the car is largely irrelevant, unless, perhaps, it is a "considerable distance" 2
from its owner. Rather, the crucial issue is whether the defendant brings the purse or
wallet out of the car.
Here, instead of acknowledging that Gibson should control, the district court, in its
Memorandum Opinion denying Ms. Easterday's motion to suppress, largely ignored

Gibson and asserted that "Idaho case law does not provide a ready answer to the
question ... presently before the Court." (R, p.100.) It then went on to discuss the
above cases, and two cases out of Kansas, before arriving at the surprising conclusion
that whether the defendant leaves the car with the purse is not the crucial issue, because
the protection given to purses only applies if the defendant takes some action, such as
placing the purse in her lap, before probable cause to search the car is established.

See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (Breyer J., concurring). Justice
Breyer agreed that the purse in question was subject to search because it was found at a
"considerable distance from its owner" i.e., still in the car after she had exited, and she
did not "claim ownership" of the purse until after the officer "discovered her identification
while looking through it."
2
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(R., p.105.) But this was never an issue in Gibson. Indeed, there was no finding there
that Mr. Gibson's wallet was actually attached to him when the dog alerted on his
vehicle. It was not a relevant fact.
The district court went on to say that the Hofland case "although factually similar,
does not answer the question posed in the instant case because in Holland, the
defendant voluntarily left her purse in the car." (R., p.100.) To the contrary, it actually
does answer the question because the contrast with Newsom is highly instructive. The
district court also said that Holland was not helpful because "the Idaho Supreme Court
resolved that case through the application of the incident to arrest doctrine . . . . "
(R., p.100.) But it failed to acknowledge that Newsom also involved the incident to arrest
doctrine and yet it did not hesitate to say that, based on Newsom, Ms. Easterday's purse
had to have been in her lap when the drug dog alerted in order for her purse to be
considered part of her person. (R., p.104.) Clearly, the application of that doctrine does
not affect the facts surrounding the purses or the protection to which they are entitled.
Again, the crucial issue is whether the purse is attached to the person when she leaves
the car, as it is ordinarily carried, or is voluntarily left in the car. The location of the purse
is a peripheral issue, and the district court's focus on this issue leads to the unworkable
rule discussed below.

2.

The District Court's Interpretation Of Precedent Was Flawed And Would
Create An Unworkable Rule That Would Pose A Host Of Potential Privacy
Concerns And Pitfalls For Law Enforcement Attempting To Enforce It

Ultimately, the district court's synthesis of the precedent led to the following ruling:
(1) a citizen in an automobile can have a privacy interest in a purse that
trumps the container search rule enunciated in Ross [United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982]; (2) in order to assert that privacy interest, a
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some
such
voluntarily removing (or attempting
remove) the purse from
automobile when exiting; (3) the protections
in (1) and
only apply if: (a) there is no probable cause
the purse before the citizen is removed from the car or (b) there is
no independent
to search the citizen (such as search incident to
arrest or the presence of other factors as described in Gibson, 141 Idaho
277, 108 P.3d 424).
(R., p.104.)

While the first two points are accurate, the third point is not supported by Idaho
case law-specifically Gibson.

The district court's reference to the "other factors" in

Gibson actually concerns a completely different issue-whether probable cause existed
to arrest Mr. Gibson for possession of a controlled substance prior to the search of the
wallet such that the search would have been valid as a search incident to

See

Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282. Those factors were not relevant to the issue of whether the
search of his wallet was lawful based on the automobile exception. Indeed, the State
actually conceded this issue on appeal. Id. Thus, Gibson makes it clear that a dog alert
on a car does not destroy a citizen's expectation of privacy in a wallet, and, therefore, a
purse.
Moreover, as Ms. Easterday's counsel argued below, such a rule could create a
myriad of problems and would discriminate against women.

Men often carry wallets

only; women tend to carry purses because they need to carry more personal items, such
as feminine hygiene products. Wallets can stay in a pocket while seated, but purses
have to be put down-especially if the owner of the purse is driving.
Also, if a woman was actually aware of a rule such as this, and moved her purse
onto her lap preemptively, this action might create suspicion in the mind of the officer
speaking with her through her window.

Further, men's wallets, though smaller and
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carried in a pocket, nevertheless usually have to be brought out to provide identification,
so this could become sort of a game.

For example, if an officer asked for a man's

driver's license at the same time a second officer was walking a drug dog around the car,
would the fact that the man then put his wallet on his seat while waiting for the first officer
to return with his license magically turn the wallet into a container subject to search if the
dog alerted during the time the first officer was running the driver's record? Or, under
the same circumstances (two officers), would a woman moving her purse off her lap and
onto the passenger seat to reach for her registration in the glove compartment suddenly
turn the purse into a "normal" container if the dog alerted at that moment?
Finally, it is unreasonable and unsafe to expect women to wear purses while
driving. Instead, it is only reasonable to require women to take their purses with them
when leaving the car. This resumes the purse's normal state-attached to the person.
Here, Ms. Easterday's purse was on the seat next to her where a woman normally
puts a purse when driving. What matters is that she took it with her when she stepped
out the car. But it is evident from the suppression hearing that the prosecutor did not
agree with this conclusion, and the district court was struggling with the prosecutor's
argument.

For example, at one point, the district court asked the prosecutor "So the

lesson is that if you're driving down the road, and you know you're about to get busted
up, you've got to open your purse, pick up your purse and hold onto it?" (Tr. 10/25/13,
p.20, Ls.8-11.) The prosecutor replied "Absolutely." This approach is not in line with
precedent.

And the district court's ruling misinterpreted that precedent and did not

consider the ramifications and practical realities of such an interpretation.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Easterday respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied her motion to
suppress.
DATED this 28 th day of October, 2014.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

15

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28 th day of October, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
ASHLI MARIE EASTERDAY
4576 N 900 EAST
BUHL ID 83316
RANDY J STOKER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
ROBIN AMBROSE
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

~- -· --;;::-

,:.:.:_:____

. · ...

-,,~
EVAN~·-·--y--·-·---------.
Administrative Assist'?:rnt____./
· ...
RPA/eas

16

